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Uncivil Challenges? Support for
Civil Liberties Among Religious
Activists
John C. Green, University of Akron
James L. Guth, Furman University
Lyman A. Kellstedt, Wheaton College
Corwin E . Smidt, Calvin College
A central _feature of democratic regimes is routine and vigorous
challenges to those in power. Such challenges require both legal
protection for civil liberties and popular support for the norms of
political tolerance. On the surface, the American regime is substantially
democratic, enjoying vital opposition and constitutionally protected
civil liberties . But deeper investigation reveals that popular support for
civil liberties has often been remarkably low, threatening the actual
operation of democracy. Indeed, the mass public's intolerance has led
some scholars to contend that civil liberties are preserved only by the
values of the "political strata" of elites and activists. Even among them,
however, critics have found a distressing lack of tolerance, particularly
among some of the most vigorous challenging groups.
Protestant fundamentalism
and other forms of religious
traditionalism have long been identified as wellsprings of such "uncivil
challenges," from Gerald L. K. Smith and Charles Coughlin in 1930s,
through Carl McIntire and Billy James Hargis in the 1950s, to Jerry
Falwell and Pat Robertson more recently (Ribuffo 1983). Less colorful
and controversial religious activists have often been suspected of
intolerance as well (Streiker and Strober 1972). Seldom, however, have
such evaluations been based on survey evidence on grass-roots religious
activists , relying instead on inferences from the pronouncements of
leaders and the association of religiosity with political intolerance in the
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Further assistance was provided by the Research and Professional Growth
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mass public. Indeed, religious activists, like other elements of the
political strata, have received less scrutiny than warranted by the
expectations of theorists (Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, and Roberts 1985).
In this essay, we take a systematic look at support for civil
liberties in a large sample of religious activists, members of groups
which have recently challenged the power structure from the right and
from the left. We find that religious activists resemble their secular
counterparts in most ways with respect to tolerance, but more
importantly, that religious factors have a special impact. In line with
conventional wisdom, we discover that fundamentalism is indeed
connected with intolerance, but we also find that other dimensions of
religion are either unrelated to, or actually foster support for, civil
liberties. We argue that "uncivil" challenges from religious groups
originate in broad pessimism about the practices and products of
politics as usual, while more "civil" challenges reflect narrower
grievances and a more optimistic view of the political process. Both are
rooted, however, in divergent theological perspectives.
Religious
Liberties

Activists,

Political

Challenges,

and

Civil

Religion has often been a source of challenges to the dominant
American political order. After all, the Revolutionaries invoked divine
authority to sanction their rebellion, an example followed by many
"unruly" (Gamson 1975) movements thereafter. This tendency was
encouraged by constitutional arrangements which facilitate religious
mobilization in politics: the First Amendment's prohibition of a
religious establishment and guarantee of free exercise combined with the
great diversity of American society to produce a vital and variegated
religious community. Operating in this environment, religion has been
a potent resource for many challenging movements, from abolition to
civil rights, as well as for more routine opposition via the ballot box,
the bar, and the lobby.
Of course, religious activists have also sided at times with the
status quo and opposed challenging groups with great vigor, especially
when these demanded innovations in social roles and behaviors (Berger
1967). Nevertheless, one must resist the temptation to think of
"conservative" religion as part of the American "establishment": even
when socially traditionalist, religion has been a potent source of
political opposition and dissent. The Christian Right is just the most
recent example of a conservative religious challenge to state power
(Wilcox 1992). In fact, conservative and liberal believers have often
expressed similar grievances and often used the same beliefs in their
challenges, a point well illustrated by the 1988 presidential campaigns
of Pat Robertson and Jesse Jackson (Hertzke 1993).
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Religion is an important source of opposition to regime policies
because it can mobilize both institutions and beliefs. First, the
religious can often activate strong, grassroots institutions that are both
independent of the state and repositories of valuable resources such as
money, organizational skills, and most important, highly committed
members. Second, religion produces powerful worldviews and
allegiances among many adherents. Such beliefs can make religious
institutions distinctive and often put them at odds with political
arrangements. Drawing on transcendent authority for standards of
behavior, religious leaders routinely critique the "powers of the earth"
on a wide range of topics. Their constant reinterpretation of beliefs in
light of everyday experience can provide an ideological focus for
political opposition and dissent.
Ironically, in challenging the American political order religious
activists are often accused of not respecting the very civil liberties
which permit such challenges. How valid is this charge? The literature
on tolerance provides some clues about the political tolerance of
religious activists. First, research has consistently shown that the
political strata are markedly more tolerant than the mass public, so
religious activists may be more supportive of civil liberties than the
religious mass public. But second, the two major explanations advanced
to account for tolerance, elite socialization and ideological dominance,
both suggest there may be considerable variation in tolerance among
religious activists.
Beginning with Stouffer (1955) and supported by a host of other
studies (McClosky and Brill 1983; Nunn , Crockett, and Williams 1978;
Jackman 1972), scholars have argued that the political strata are more
tolerant because elites have learned and relearned the value of civil
liberties through a variety of mechanisms. Formal education is crucial
to this process because it expands individual choice, broadens social
horizons, and inculcates libertarian norms. In the same ways, the
cosmopolitan culture of large cities and professional occupations creates
greater tolerance. In addition, youth has been strongly associated with
tolerance because of the increasingly libertarian themes of popular
culture experienced by those coming of age since World War II and,
especially , since the 1960s (Roof 1993). Participating in public affairs
also socializes and resocializes activists to libertarian norms: more
informed and active individuals develop tolerance through the rough and
tumble of politics (Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, Barnum, and Gibson
1993).
From this perspective, tolerance is the product of individual
development, part of a broader constellation of democratic procedural
values that distinguishes the political strata from the public. This view
has been challenged by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982),
however, who adopt a more explicitly political view of tolerance. Using
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innovative methods which allowed respondents to choose the group
they disliked most, Sullivan found the United States to be characterized
by "pluralistic intolerance. " Intolerance is widespread because most
citizens are intolerant of some group which they fear or intensely
dislike. Ideology influences the choice of "target" group: citizens fear or
dislike groups on the far side of the political spectrum. Thus, on the
surface, liberals and conservatives are just as likely to support civil
liberties, but for different kinds of groups, and the greater tolerance of
the political strata is largely an artifact of survey measures asking about
groups that elites and activists do not fear. Similarly, the final
distribution of tolerance is a product of both ideological predispositions
and choice of target groups: when all factors are considered, liberals are
more tolerant than conservatives, in part because of general ideological
support for democratic norms, and in part because of the fewer threats
perceived from the groups they dislike (Sullivan et al. 1982, 232-236).
This line of research argues that perception of threat is central to
tolerance and has three components. First, the specific activities which
are to be tolerated matter. Behaviors that are potentially dangerous or
damaging are less likely to be accepted. Second, the nature of the target
group is important: "dangerous" or "antidemocratic " groups are less
likely to be tolerated . Third, the level of hostility citizens hold toward
the political process also has an effect. Those who feel marginalized or
maligned by politics as usual are less likely to be tolerant.
Previous research using the Sullivan technique on political
activists has revealed that "pluralistic intolerance" is not an accurate
description of their views, but that tolerance is indeed associated with
ideology (Guth and Green 1991). Overall, liberal activists are the most
tolerant, but their support for civil liberties is part of a broader political
agenda. Their libertarian values are part of an "ideology of rights,"
dedicated to the expansion of substantive advantages for groups they
support. Conservative activists are less tolerant, in large part because
they oppose the liberal "rights" agenda. Thus, activists' attitudes toward
controversial social issues advanced by contemporary movements are
central to explaining their support--or lack of it--for civil liberties.
Religion plays an important role in both elite socialization and
ideological explanations of tolerance. Religious training is an element
of socialization and religious beliefs are an important component of
ideology . Numerous studies have found that absence of religiosity or
"secular detachment" (often correlated with cosmopolitanism) is an
important source of tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1982, 135-139). For
many theorists , religiosity has the opposite effect of education and
living in cosmopolitan environments: religious belief reduces the range
of individual choice, social involvement, and support for libertarian
values. Religious commitment supposedly reinforces the "dogmatic "
tendencies of belief. Beside their negative impact on socialization into
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libertarian norms, religious beliefs routinely underlie political ideology,
particularly in the political strata (Green, Guth, and Fraser 1991). Such
connections vary by religious tradition, of course, but within each
tradition, doctrinal orthodoxy is often linked to political conservatism,
particularly on social or moral issues, while more heterodox beliefs are
associattd with more liberal views (Smidt and Penning 1982; Beatty
and Walter 1984).
Religiosity and orthodoxy aside, certain doctrinal systems would
seem to have particular relevance. Here we focus on a very important
American Protestant movement: fundamentalism. This term is
commonly misused in popular and scholarly discourse to refer variously
to strict doctrinal orthodoxy, extremely strong religious commitment,
or intense dogmatism. While fundamentalism can be associated with
these traits, it properly refers to a specific theological outlook that arose
among Protestants early in this century in opposition to modernist or
liberal theological trends, eventually extending to a thorough critique of
modern society (Marsden 1980). Fundamentalists insisted on the
inerrancy of the Bible, belief in the "fundamentals" of historic Christian
orthodoxy, and ecclesiological and social separation from those who did
not accept these beliefs. Fundamentalists were also heavily influenced
by "End Times" thinking, encouraging them to "save" all the souls
they could before the Second Coming of Christ (Boyer 1992).
'
This understanding of the nature of the world, religious truth, and
the future sharply restricts the range of individual choice, social
connections, and acceptance of legitimate differences of opinion.
Fundamentalists are pessimistic about the world, interpreting life as a
cosmic struggle between God and Satan, where there is no margin to
tolerate "error" nor those who accommodate it. A literal reading of
Scripture, especially the prophetic visions in the Old and New
Testaments, provides the warrant for this and other convictions,
including confidence in the imminent return of Christ to join in a
cataclysmic battle that will end human history. In addition to the
theological elements of fundamentalism which reduce support for civil
liberties, several cultural tendencies of the movement might also
produce less support. The deep antagonism that fundamentalists have
towards the modem world may reduce their exposure to and appreciation
of different kinds of people and ideas. Along these lines,
fundamentalists are deeply concerned with the "moral decay" of the
country, producing strongly conservative views on social issues, which
may contribute to intolerance. Finally, fundamentalists view
themselves as victims of "cultural aggression" by the political
establishment, and this sense of threat could affect support for civil
liberties as well.
These fundamentalist views, coupled with the prodigious
intellectual effort undergirding their many variations, arose to counter
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modernist or liberal theologies which attacked Manichean worldviews,
ahistorical readings of sacred texts, and detailed apocalyptic scenarios
(Hutchinson 1976). By their very nature, such critical departures from
the "old time religion" enhanced individual choice, encouraged social
interaction, and legitimated disagreement even on sacred things. Thus,
modernist or liberal theological perspectives, which focus on more
"worldly" conflicts, could have the opposite effect from fundamentalist
doctrine, expanding libertarian values, promoting liberal attitudes, and
encouraging a benign view of the political system.
In sum, then, religion is an important source of challenges to the
political system, and there is reason to believe that fundamentalist
religious challenges may be associated with intolerance. Like other
elements of the political strata, religious activists are likely to be more
tolerant than the public, but the distribution of tolerance among them is
likely Lo reflect the same factors as their secular counterparts. More
specifically, religiosity and orthodoxy are likely to reduce tolerance,
particularly among activists influenced by fundamentalism. By the same
token, modernist or liberal theology may be associated with support for
civil liberties.

Data and Methods
This study is based on a national mail survey of religious activists
taken in 1990-91. A stratified random sample was drawn from the
membership of eight prominent interest groups with ties to religious
communities, deliberately chosen to span the ideological spectrum.
Several of the groups are central to the Christian Right, others are
drawn from a less publicized Christian Left, with the rest falling in
between. 1 The survey generated a 56.9% return rate for a total of 4,995
usable returns of a ten-page, 250-item questionnaire.
1The groups sampled included: Bread for the World, an anti-hunger
lobby founded in 1973; JustLife, a political action committee in operation
from 1986 to 1993, which promoted a "consistent life ethic" on abortion,
economic justice and the arms race; Evangelicals for Social Action, formed
in 1978, represents progressive evangelicals on a range of political and
social issues; the National Association of Evangelicals is the primary voice
of Evangelical Protestantism dating from 1942 and the counterpart to the
mainline National Council of Churches; Prison Fellowship was founded by
Chuck Colson in 1976 and lobbies for prison reform; Focus on the Family
has been led by its founder, radio psychologist James Dobson, since 1977
and advocates traditionalist family policies; Americans for the Republic, a
political action committee created to finance Pat Robertson's 1988
presidential campaign was the base for the Christian Coalition, an interest
group which organizes evangelicals at the grassroots; Concerned Women
for America is an evangelical organization advocating traditional values
since 1978. For more details see Smidt, Kellstedt, Green and Guth (1994).
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To tap support for civil liberties, we modified the Sullivan et al.
(1982) "content-controlled" measure for a mail instrument. The item
asked: "Many people believe there are dangerous political organizations
and groups in America today. Would you name THE political
organization that you regard as MOST dangerous to the country right
now?" After a space for the answer, the respondent was asked if the
group just named should be allowed to make political speeches, run
candidates for public office, demonstrate in the community or teach in
public schools, and if the government should be allowed to outlaw the
group or tap their telephones. In each case, the response categories were
"yes," "not sure," and "no." We ask a similar set of questions in a 1982
survey of a broader sample of political party and interest group
activists, allowing us to put the present sample in context (Guth and
Green 1991).
We used these data to develop Tolerance and Group Threat scales.
The Tolerance scale summed the three-point responses to the six
activity items into a single thirteen-point scale, ranging from fully
intolerant to fully tolerant responses. This scale is highly reliable
(alpha=.82) and versions of it using only the most highly correlated
items generated very similar results . This Tolerance scale serves as the
dependent variable in following analysis. The Group Threat scale was
constructed in two steps. First, the groups named by the respondents
were recoded into nine categories according to a combination of
ideological (liberal to conservative) and procedural criteria (reflecting the
extent to which the groups named had a history of not respecting
democratic procedures), with "extremist left" (communists, socialists)
and "extremist right" (Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis) anchoring each end,
and "centrist" groups (more moderate ideological groups, the major
political parties) filling in the middle (see Table 1). This categorization
was then recombined into a three-point scale to isolate the procedural
dimension of target group selection, with all "extremists" at one end
and "centrists" at the other. In the following analysis, this Group Threat
scale is used to control for the potential threat of the groups targeted.

Tolerance

among

Religious

Activists

Just how tolerant are these religious activists? Table 1 gives an
overview of our measures of support for civil liberties. First, note that
like other elements of the political strata, religious activists are quite
tolerant: nearly two-thirds would allow a group regarded as "dangerous"
to make a public speech, and more than three-fifths would prohibit the
government from tapping telephones or outlawing the group. A similar
proportion would allow the group to run candidates for office. On the
other hand, only slightly more than one-half would allow the group to
demonstrate in their community, probably reflecting their concerns
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about the potential for violent confrontation, and only one-fifth would
allow a member to teach in public schools, exhibiting the special
sensitivities associated with education (Jelen and Wilcox 1990). Such
patterns are consistent with previous research: distant and purely
political activities are more acceptable than those closer to home and
less clearly political (Gibson 1987a). Indeed, the demonstrating and
teaching items add significantly to the variation in our Tolerance scale.
And religious activists seem more sensitive to these activities than their
secular counterparts.

TableI
Support for Civil Liberties Among Religious Activists
(N=4384)
Would Allow "Dangerous " Group To:
Make a speech in a public place
Prohibit government to tap telephone
Prohibit government to outlaw group
Run candidates for public office
Demonstrate in respondent's community
Member teach in the public schools

Percent of Sample

65.5
63.5
61.4
61.1

55.0
20.9

Tolerance Scale:
Top quarter (highly tolerant)
Second quarter
Third quarter
Bottom quarter (highly intolerant)

49.8
13.0
19.9
17.3

Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Survey .
As a group, religious activists compare quite favorably with the
mass public and other political activists . For example , 50% of
Sullivan's 1978 Twin City mass sample would allow a public speech
by a dangerous group and only 19% would allow teaching in public
school (Sullivan et al. 1982); Gibson's {1987b) national sample showed
50% and 18% on these same items, respectively. In contrast, our 1982
political activist study found that 81 % would allow a public speech and
52% teaching in public school. Thus, these religious activists stand
between other activists and the mass public on the most tolerated
activity, speech, but resemble the mass public on the activity least
tolerated, teaching in public school. Over all, religious activists look
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more like their secular counterparts than like the mass public, however,
with almost one-half falling into the top one-quarter of our Tolerance
scale (Guth and Green 1991).
The religious activists differ markedly from the 1982 sample,
however, in the groups they chose as dangerous. As Table 2 shows,
only about one-twentieth listed extremist left groups, almost five times
fewer than the 1982 sample of activists (5% versus 24%), and more
than one-fifth named extremist right groups, more than twice the
number in the broader sample (22% versus 10%). The difference is made
up by listings of more mainstream liberal and conservative groups; the
Table 2
Group Threat and Support for Civil Liberties
Among Religious Activists
(N=4384)
Percent of Sample
Naming Type
of Group

Percent Naming
Group In Top
Quarter of
Tolerance Scale

Dangerous Groups
Extremist Left
Feminist, Pro-Choice
Secularist
Other Liberal
Centrist
Other Conservative
Anti-feminist, Pro-Life
Christian Right
Extremist Right

5.1
22.5
31.8
4.2
7.9
4.1
0.7
1.8
21.9

29.8
44.0
49.8
50.0
53.3
79.5
91.8
93.3
49.l

27.0
56.7
16.2

45.4
52.4
58.8

Group Threat Scale
Extremist Groups
Mainstream Ideological
Centrist Groups

Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Survey.
former are nearly twice as common here (58% to 27%) and the latter
almost six times less frequently named (6% to 29%). Some of these
differences from the 1982 sample reflect the changed political world:
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communists and other leftists no longer dominated the international
headlines in 1991. Nevertheless, religious activists clearly have
distinctive contemporary concerns. Feminist groups, such as NOW and
pro-choice organizations, receive much attention, and special ire is
reserved for "secularist" groups, perceived as hostile to religion, such as
People for the American Way and the ACLU. (In fact, the ACLU was
by far the most commonly mentioned group.) On the other side,
Christian Right and pro-life groups are barely mentioned, even by
liberal activists, who oppose them politically but apparently do not
regard them as dangerous. About an equal number of standard liberal
(e.g. environmentalists) and conservative (e.g. business) groups are
mentioned, nearly matching the number of centrist groups such as the
major parties. Taken together, these mainstream groups are less
commonly named than secularists and feminists , but much more feared
than Christian Rightists and their allies.
Table 2 also shows the distribution of tolerance across the kinds of
groups named . Only about one-third of those mentioning extremist left
groups fall in the top one-quarter of the tolerance scale, while about
one-half of those naming extremist right groups are highly tolerant.
Those naming feminist and secularist groups are much less tolerant
than those mentioning pro-life, Christian Right, or centrist groups.
Finally, Table 2 provides some evidence on the Group Threat scale,
revealing that the nature of the group named is linked to tolerance
Table 3
Ideological Cluster and Support for Civil Liberties
Among Religious Activists
(N=4384)
Percent in Top Quarter
Of Tolerance Scale

IdeologicalCluster
Christian Right
Traditional Conservatives
Christian Moderates
Pro-Life Liberals
Christian Left

41
42
53
71

73

Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Study
quite apart from ideology: respondents listing extremist groups are
much less tolerant than those who list centrist groups.
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Ideology is not only a factor in target group selection, but in the
civil liberties granted target groups as well. Some direct evidence on
this point is presented in Table 3. Using the numerous political items
in the survey, we divided respondents into five opinion clusters: the
"Christian Left," "Pro-Life Liberals," "Christian Moderates,"
"Traditional Conservatives," and the "Christian Right" (cf. Smidt,
Kellstedt, Green and Guth 1994). Note the monotonic increase in the
proportion of each group in the top quarter of the Tolerance scale.
Clearly, liberal activists are more tolerant, resembling the liberal social
movement activists surveyed in 1982. The Christian Right activists are
the least tolerant, matching the figures for the 1982 representatives of
the Christian Right, but also paralleling the patterns for business and
conservative activists (Guth and Green 1991). Taken together, all these
measures show that religious activists resemble the broader activist
corps, including considerable variation in tolerance linked to ideology
and perceived threat.

The Correlates of Tolerance
What accounts for the variation in tolerance among these religious
activists? Table 4 offers some evidence on the religious, political and
demographic correlates of tolerance, beginning with bivariate
correlations in the first column, followed in the second column by the
results of a regression analysis for each category of variables, and
finally in the third column, a regression analysis combining all of the
variables . To simplify presentation, Table 4 reports the results for
scales combining a number of specific variables, which are of some
interest individually and will be discussed in the text.
Religion. This survey contains extensive batteries of religious
questions which provide a detailed look at the link between religion and
support for civil liberties. Analysis of these questions produced three
measures that were negatively and persistently associated with tolerance:
fundamentalism, charismatic beliefs, and piety. We also included other
measures of religion more commonly used in other studies of tolerance,
such as religious tradition, Christian orthodoxy, religious salience and
religious involvement. As we shall see, although these facets of
religion are often correlated with tolerance at the bivariate level, this tie
disappears when other variables are taken into account.
Our fundamentalism scale captures adherence to the essential
doctrines of that movement (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991) . Of the
component elements, our measure of "religious separatism" {the belief
that true Christians remain separate from the "world") shows the single
largest bivariate correlation with tolerance among the fundamentalism
items (-.27), rivaling the impact of education. Religious separatism is
followed closely by Biblical literalism, also a central doctrine of
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Green, Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt
fundamentalism (-.26), and then by belief in the "rapture" of the church
(-.23), Biblical prophecy (-.21), and a premillennial view of Scripture
(-.17), all closely linked to yet another "fundamental," the Second
Coming of Jesus Christ. 2 Other fundamentalist beliefs and
identifications also correlate negatively with tolerance, including the
historicity of Adam and Eve (-.22), opposition to women clergy (-.20),
conversion by a sudden "born again" experience (-.17), fundamentalist
self-identification (-.17), and belief in the inherent sinfulness of human
nature (-.10). Respondents who reject these views (and are found at the
other end of the fundamentalism scale) are strikingly more tolerant.
This evidence also reveals the analytic importance of separating
fundamentalism from religious orthodoxy or simple piety. We find
doctrinal orthodoxy per se is not part of the fundamentalism scale (even
though most fundamentalists are quite orthodox). Beliefs central to
historic Christianity, such as salvation only through Jesus Christ, that
He was fully God and fully man, and the historicity of the Virgin Birth
and Resurrection are not associated with intolerance once
fundamentalism is taken into account. Many orthodox activists are, in
fact, quite tolerant. Much the same applies to religious tradition:
Evangelical Protestants (the category including most fundamentalists)
are modestly less tolerant than the Mainline Protestants and Catholics,
but this association also fades once adherence to fundamentalist doctrine
is controlled (cf. Jelen and Wilcox 1990).3 And, finally, other measures
sometimes correlated with intolerance in previous research, such as
religious salience and church involvement, are not related here, once
fundamentalism is in the equation.
Two other religious measures are closely tied to tolerance in the
bivariate analysis, but do not persist in the final regression. Piety
(including witnessing, attending revival meetings, frequent prayer and
Bible reading) and charismatic beliefs (belief in the "second baptism" of
the Holy Spirit, speaking in tongues, and Pentecostal or charismatic
identification) are both negatively linked to tolerance, perhaps reflecting
the intense social experiences associated with these activities. But it is
their link with fundamentalism and other non-religious factors that
accounts for their relationship with intolerance.
2The elements of fundamentalism are so closely linked as to make
distinctions among them difficult. However, careful multivariate ~alysis
suggests that Biblical literalism has the strongest independent effect on
tolerance, followed by premillennialism, and separatism, although all three
have similar magnitudes .
3 Our measure of religious tradition includes Evangelical Protestants,
Mainline Protestants and Catholics. We posited that political tolerance
would be lowest among Evangelicals, higher among Mainliners, and
highest in the Catholic tradition . For more detail on religious traditions,
see Leege and Kellstedt (1993).
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Among these activists, then, fundamentalism is strongly related to
Table4
Correlatesof Tolerance
Among Religious Activists
(N:4384)
Bivariate
Correlation

Religious Variables
Fundamentalism
Orthodoxy
Charismatic
Tradition
Piety
Involvement
Salience

(r)

-.29*
-.16
-.13
-.09.
-.07
-.06
-.01

Multiple r
r2

PoliticalFactors
Christian Militancy
Social Conservatism
Information Use
Target Group Scale
Economic Conservatism
Political Participation

Multiple r
r2

Combined
Regression

(beta)

(beta)

-.29
.ns
-.10
.ns
-.06
.ns
.ns

-.16
.ns
.ns
.ns
.ns
.ns
.ns

.32
.12

-.35
-.28
.27
.18
-.13
.14

Multiple r
r2

Demography
Education
Age
Cosmopolitan
Geooer

Categorical
Regression

-.24
-.12
.16
.20
-.06
.13

-.20
-.10
.11
.20
.ns
.12

.37
.14
.32
-.20
.18
-.14

.25
-.16
.08
-.08

.09
-.10
.07
-.05

.36
.13

.57
.33

* All coefficients significant at the .05 level or better; .ns = not
significant
Source: 1990-91 Wheaton Religious Activist Survey.
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intolerance, and its nemesis, theological modernism or liberalism, is
conducive to support for civil liberties, while broader measures of belief
and religiosity show no independent association. These findings may be
an artifact of this special sample, but the very crude measures of
religion used in nearly all studies of civil liberties probably obscure as
much as they reveal about the specific religious forces which influence
tolerance. We are confident that precise doctrinal measures will produce
more accurate results even in mass samples (Leege and Kellstedt 1993).
Political Factors. Given that this is a sample of the political strata,
it should come as no surprise that political variables are strongly
associated with tolerance. Once again, in Table 4 a large number of
attitudinal items were reduced to three measures associated with support
for civil liberties. The most important is what we call Christian
militancy, which shows the largest negative relationship with tolerance
at the bivariate level and holds much of its power in the combined
analysis. Social conservatism and economic conservatism are also
negatively associated with tolerance, but only the fonner is significant
in the combined analysis, having about one-half the impact of Christian
militancy. As noted above, Group Threat is negatively linked to
tolerance, and its effects persist in the combined analysis, matching the
effects of militancy. Finally, the sources of political information and
level of political participation also contribute to support for civil
liberties, rivaling the impact of social issues, but in the opposite
direction. Each measure deserves a detailed explanation as well.
The Christian militancy scale is made up of a fascinating
combination of attitudes. The strongest is the view that the country
needs a "Christian" political party (r=-.34 with tolerance). This demand
is closely connected with other attitudes: that candidates' religious
beliefs are important in vote choice (-.28); that there is one correct
"Christian" view on political issues (-.28); that a diversity of moral
views does not "create a healthy society" (-.23); that social problems
would be solved if "enough people were brought to Christ" (-.21); and,
that religious people need "special protection for their rights" today (.21). These items reveal a deep-seated distrust of the political process,
accompanied by an aggressive response to being a "mistreated minority"
rather than a "moral majority." These patterns are confinned by answers
to an open-ended question on the most serious problems facing the
nation: Christian militants list more political process problems than
non-militants. Conversely, a more optimistic view of the political
process is associated with greater tolerance.
The Group Threat scale parallels the militancy scale conceptually:
respondents who fear groups with a history of not respecting democratic
norms are less tolerant, as the literature predicts. But Christian
militancy and Group Threat are unrelated statistically and represent
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different phenomena: the former reflects perceived threats from the
political process, while the latter measures threats from particular
groups within the process. Although it may be tempting for some
observers to ascribe personal alienation or rigid personalities to
respondents who feel these threats, there is little evidence on either
point in this survey. 4 What is clear, however, is that concern with
moral decay and the consequent disorder are also strongly associated
with the perception of threat for many activists.
The connection between the threat of disorder and tolerance is
amply illustrated by three items not used in the analysis. First,
respondents who disagreed with the statement that "We should be more
tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral
standards even if they are very different from our own" were much less
tolerant than those who agreed (35% versus 74% in the top quarter of
the tolerance scale). Similarly, respondents who disagreed with allowing
the "followers of Reverend Moon" the same access to public school
classrooms before and after school as other religious groups were less
tolerant than those who agreed (20% versus 74%), and those who felt
that the drug problem was so serious as to require "sacrifice" of civil
liberties were also less tolerant (34% versus 69%). These data suggest
an unwillingness to accept behaviors likely to unravel the social fabric,
and little respect is accorded those who advocate or defend such
behaviors. To be sure, other activists feel the social fabric threatened by
economic injustice, environmental degradation--and even a loss of civil
liberties! Not surprisingly, such views are associated with tolerance.
Social issue conservatism also has an independent impact on
tolerance, confirming previous findings (Guth and Green 1991).
Important items in this measure include opposition to gay rights (-.36);
support for school prayer (-.25); opposition to providing birth control
information in schools (-.22) and to teaching evolution without also
teaching creationism (-.21); support for capital punishment (-.21);
opposition to affirmative action (- .20), support for regulating
pornography (-.20), and a pro-life position on abortion (-.18). All these
involve controversial questions of substantive rights; opponents of
expanding substantive rights to liberal constituencies are less
supportive of procedural rights, and vice versa.
The positive role of information sources and political participation
on tolerance supports the findings in the literature concerning the
socializing and resocializing effects of engagement in public affairs
(Sullivan et al. 1993). Our information index combines the use of two
4 Although

some earlier scholars argue for a psychological explanation
for tolerance (cf. Sullivan et al. 1982), we have no direct measures of
psychological rigidity or dogmatism . Although a few of our religious and
political measures may seem to tap those dimensions, we suspect that they
are better thought of as ideological characteristics, not psychological ones.
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different kinds of media: religious sources that are used principally by
conservative religious communities and public sources used by
everyone. Religious media use is negatively associated with tolerance,
including religious television (-.21), religious radio (-. 19), direct mail (.12), and the clergy (-.09). On the other hand, use of public media is
positively associated with tolerance: newspapers (.14), news magazines
(.13), opinion magazines (.11), and radio news (.07). When all these
items were combined into a single scale, ranging from high and
exclusive religious media use to high and exclusive use of public
sources, the results are impressive: information use is one of the largest
correlates of tolerance at the bivariate level, rivaling the impact of
education and fundamentalism . Political participation shows a similar
impact. While many forms of political activity were not associated with
tolerance, actions that involve the exercise of civil liberties were. These
include contacting public officials (.13), participating in a boycott
(. 10), writing a letter to the editor (.08), participating in a
demonstration and signing a petition (both .07). An additive index
using these items was employed in the analysis. Although participation
has roughly one-half the impact of information sources at the bivariate
level, it persists in multivariate analysis, and eventually exceeds the
importance of information sources in the combined analysis.
In conclusion, a host of political variables influence tolerance.
These include perceptions of threat from the political system, particular
groups, and rivals on substantive issues. These findings confirm earlier
researchers' arguments on the political nature of support for civil
liberties. In addition, as political theorists have long argued, the
socializing and resocializing effects of involvement in public affairs
enhance tolerance as well.
Demography. What about the influence of broader forms of
socialization identified in the literature? Do age, gender, education and
cosmopolitan demography influence tolerance in this relatively high
status sample of religious activists? In line with previous studies,
education is strongly and positively associated with tolerance, rivaling
fundamentalism and social conservatism. Cosmopolitanism shows a
smaller positive effect, while age and gender have modest negative
associations. All of these variables survive multivariate analysis,
although age ranks first in the combined analysis. 5
5College major was coded according to the liberal nature of the course of
study, with social science and humanities majors at one end of the scale and
applied majors at the other . The kind of college attended was coded
according to the prestige of the institution, ranging from elite universities
to community and Bible colleges. Occupation is also coded according to
prestige, with "New Class" professions at one end of the scale and bluecollar employment at the other . Income is coded in a standard fashion .
Place of residence is coded according to size of place, ranging from rural
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Our education measure is actually made up three variables, all
strongly related to tolerance: years of education (r=.30), college major
(.26), and the kind of institution attended (.24) . The combination of all
three factors captures the libertarian impact of formal education (Selvin
and Hagstrom 1960). Age also had the expected relationship with
tolerance; activists under 35 years of age hold the most libertarian
values and those over 65 the least. Exposure to cosmopolitan culture
has a similar impact, with higher status occupation (.17), higher
income (.11), and metropolitan residence (.10) making positive
contributions. Interestingly enough, region is not associated with
tolerance here: southerners are only modestly less tolerant than other
activists . Because of the large number of conservative women in this
sample, gender has a negative impact as well, representing one place
where religious activists differ from their secular counterparts: gender
has no impact in broader samples . So, cosmopolitan demography is
associated with tolerance independent of fundamentalism and political
attitudes.

Sources of Tolerance
How do the correlates of tolerance fit together? Figure 1 and the
accompanying table provide the results of a path analysis designed to
estimate the overall impact of these variables . Although the model
portrayed in Figure 1 is by no means complete, it represents a plausible
set of relationships among the correlates of tolerance, and has been
previously employed in the literature (Sullivan et al. 1982, 213; Guth
and Green 1991, 337). The demographic variables (including education,
gender, age, and cosmopolitanism) and fundamentalism are assumed to
be the most distant sources of tolerance. (To simplify the diagram,
direct effects of these variables are identified by parentheses at the
bottom of the diagram, and indirect paths less than .1 are excluded.)
Information sources and political participation are assumed to be the
next most distant sources of tolerance, holding an intermediary position
between demography and fundamentalism, on the one hand, and
political attitudes and tolerance, on the other. Political attitudes are then
assumed to be the most proximate sources of tolerance, including the
Group Threat scale, Christian militancy, and social conservatism .
Education and fundamentalism are strongly and negatively related to
one another even in this sample of high status activists, a finding that
would surprise neither secular academics nor fundamentalist clergy. This
starkly reflects the division between the modem, secular worldview and
the anti-modem stance of religious traditionalists. Both sides of this
dispute have important effects on other correlates of tolerance. On the
areas and small towns to major metropolitan areas .

Volume 22, 1994 I 41

Figure1

Sources
of Tolerance
PathAnalysis

-.20

Ed1cati1

Genller

TOLERANCE

r=.33

Fundamentalism
Militancy
GroupThreatScale
SocialIssues
Age
Gender
Cosmopolitanism
Pol.Participation
InformationUse
Education

TotalEffects
-.37
-.25
-.20
-.17
-.12
-.09
.08

.13
.16
.19

DirectEffects
-.16
-.20

-.20
-.10
-.10
-.05
.07
.12
.11
.09

IndirectEffects
-.21

-.05

-.07
-.02
-.04
.01
.01
.05
.10

Uncivil Challenges?
one hand, education is positively associated with other measures of
cosmopolitan demography, public information sources, and political
participation, revealing the standard relationship between higher social
status and political activity. Not surprisingly, education is also
negatively linked to militancy. On the other hand, fundamentalism is
positively associated with the use of religious information sources, the
Group Threat scale, and social issue conservatism. The large number of
conservative women in this sample gives gender a role comparable to
fundamentalism, but with a smaller magnitude. And not surprisingly,
the use of public information sources and political participation are
positively related to one another, while Christian militancy and social
issue conservatism show a similar connection.
What is the net effect of these relationships? The combination of
moderate direct impact and strong indirect effects makes fundamentalism
the largest negative influence on tolerance, followed distantly by the
measures of threat on the strength of their direct effects: the Group
Threat scale, Christian militancy, and then social conservatism. Age
and gender are also negatively related to tolerance, but al a lower level,
while cosmopolitanism, participation, information use and education
are positively associated, in ascending order. Education roughly matches
the total impact of the Group Threat scale on tolerance, and all the
demographic variables have one-third to one-half the impact of
fundamentalism.
We can now summarize the impact of religion on tolerance.
Fundamentalists are indeed less supportive of civil liberties than other
religious activists, though not perhaps as severely intolerant as some
observers suppose. Their special worldview reduces support for civil
liberties directly, but it also helps generate a higher level of perceived
threat, an aggressive distrust of the political process, and intense
concern about moral decay, all of which reduce tolerance. All these
effects are intensified through the use of specialized religious sources of
information and less cosmopolitan demography, particularly among
women. On the other hand, non-fundamentalists, many of whom are
quite orthodox and committed believers, are much more tolerant. This
pattern results in part from the libertarian tendencies of modernist
theology, but also because religious liberals have a reduced sense of
threat, less hostility toward the political system, and fewer concerns
about traditional morality. Cosmopolitan demography, especially
higher levels of education, and fuller engagement in public affairs
undergird these patterns. Of course, this situation is exactly what
fundamentalists have long feared and vigorously opposed: the erosion of
traditional values by the modem world. Indeed, the open embrace of
alternatives lo the "old time religion" by many of these highly religious
activists gives credence to their complaint.

Volume 22, 1994 I 43

Green, Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt
Religion

and Uncivil

Challenges

That fundamentalism should be the basis for any form of political
action, let alone challenges to authority, is quite surprising.
Throughout most of its history the movement has been aggressively
apolitical and harshly critical of such "worldly" entanglements by
religious people. Instead, fundamentalists dedicated themselves to
saving souls from the sinful world before the end of human history left
them to eternal damnation. No doubt fundamentalists were less tolerant
than other people on these counts, but since they eschewed public
affairs, their incivility usually went unnoticed.
At least three times in this century, however, fundamentalists have
burst into the public square with a vigorous and uncivil challenge to the
political establishment Each time political observers were shocked by
their appearance and stunned by their aggressiveness, including an
apparent lack of respect for democratic norms (Wills 1990). Numerous
explanations for these unexpected challenges have been advanced, most
focusing on the personal inadequacies of fundamentalists, but the most
satisfactory explanations emphasize rational political concerns as the
most important factors (Wilcox 1992).
Our findings offer an insight relevant to both the sudden
politicization of fundamentalists and the uncivil nature of their
challenges . Simply put, fundamentalists are goaded into politics by
sharp deviations from traditional morality that are accepted, or worse
yet, endorsed and promoted by public authorities. Such a moral
imperative provokes an angry reaction. Not only does it distract from
otherworldly concerns, it threatens the well-being of humanity on a
cosmic scale. Those who advocate such immorality are thus seen as
serious threats, while the political system that allows them to flourish-and harasses "God's people" when they fight back--is viewed with great
hostility. Indeed, fundamentalist challenges to the modem world are
"defensive offensives" (Glazer 1987) designed to stave off moral
calamity until the Lord's work on earth is completed . Thus, the very
motivation for political action reduces the civility of their politics.
The more civil challenges of modernist or liberal religious activists
also rest on moral imperatives: racial oppression, war, poverty, or
environmental degradation goad modernists to seek "what the Lord
requires." But unlike fundamentalists, these activists are more
accommodated to the modern world. Liberal theology embraces
ambiguity and complexity, reducing certainty about God's purposes and
plans. Attention is shifted from individual sin to communal injustice,
and approximating God's standards in this world becomes the focus of
concern. Concern with worldly problems leads most directly to worldly
solutions, including political action . Although the intensity of such
politics surely varies, modernists are likely to be involved on a regular
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basis. The use of and support for civil liberties thus comes naturally to
liberal religionists, even in the face of strong moral imperatives .
Thus religion can produce both civil and uncivil challenges to "the
powers that be." It is important to realize that it is not religion per se
that generates intolerance, but fundamentalist theological perspectives.
And although uncivil challenges are surely problematic, they may be
valuable forms of opposition and dissent nevertheless , calling the
concerns of large segments of the population to the attention of the
political establishment. The longer-term question is whether the
involvement of fundamentalist activists will threaten the procedural
safeguards that guarantee their own activity. Beyond the various
constitutional and legal safeguards for civil liberties, it seems likely to
us that those religious activists who venture into politics for sustained
activity will find the socializing effects of participation itself an
important restraint. Indeed, fundamentalists who find the tolerance
required for coalition-building and legislative compromise distasteful are
likely to revert to the separatist religious pursuits which have long
characterized that community.
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Appendix
We use numerous multi-item measures of religion and ideology.
These are factor scores isolated and derived by principal components
analyses with varimax rotations. The lowest reliability score was a
theta of .62 for the piety measure. These measures differ only slightly
from measures used in earlier analyses reported in Guth, Kellstedt,
Smidt and Green (1993a and 1993b).
Fundamentalism: Biblical literalism, separatism, civil law should
be based on Old Testament law, human sinfulness, self-identified
fundamentalism, the rapture of the church, premillennialism, Old
Testament prophecy, the historicity of Adam and Eve, women's
ordination, and born again experience.
Orthodoxy: Jesus the only way to salvation, historicity of Jesus'
Virgin Birth and resurrection, and Jesus fully God and fully man.
Charismatic beliefs: belief in the second baptism of the Holy
Spirit, self-identified charismatic or Pentecostal, speaking in tongues.
Piety: witnessing, attending revival meetings, frequency of private
prayer and Bible reading.
Involvement: church membership, attendance, activity, and number
of friends in congregation.
Christian militancy : need for Christian party, social ills solved by
bringing people to Christ, one correct Christian view on politics,
religion of candidates important, only one correct moral philosophy,
newer lifestyles lead to social breakdown, religious people need special
protection.
Social conservatism: support for traditional family, local regulation
of pornography, opposition to the ERA, AIDS is God's punishment,
ban gays from teaching public school, birth control information in
public schools, teach creationism along with evolution, opposition to
abortion, support for school prayer, and support for capital punishment.
Economic conservatism: world hunger, raise taxes to help the
needy, raise taxes to reduce budget deficit, environmental protection,
affirmative action.
Other measures are explained in the text or notes.
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